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Collusion and repeated games

Repeated interaction can make future retaliation affect today's incentives, potentially sustaining cooperation that is unstable in a one-shot game.

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Prisoner's dilemma
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Oligopoly
Further reading
CORE Econ, The Economy 1.0 — Unit 4: Social interactions
now next then later … cooperate 3 3 3 3 3 deviate 5 1 1 1 1 punishment continues cooperate 3 / (1 − δ) deviate 5 + δ / (1 − δ) cooperation sustainable at δ ≥ ½
Hypothetical infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, perfect monitoring, 0 ≤ δ < 1, and grim-trigger punishment. Cooperation requires 3/(1−δ) ≥ 5 + δ/(1−δ), equivalent to δ ≥ 1/2. Equality means indifference. The illustration is a model of incentives, not a statement about legality.

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