Economics
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Free riding

A free rider benefits from a collectively provided good without contributing. Individually sensible nonpayment can leave provision below the level the group values.

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Public goods
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Game theory, Collective action and cooperation
Further reading
OpenStax: 13.3 Public Goods
person B person A contribute withhold contribute withhold 10 , 10 -5 , 15 15 , -5 0 , 0 both withholdtotal · 0 CU both contribute · total 20 CU payoffs (A, B) / CU underlined · best response
Hypothetical additive public-good benefits. A’s payoff is 15 times the number of contributions minus A’s own cost, and similarly for B. Arrows show the individual incentive to withhold, despite a larger combined payoff from both contributing.

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