Economics
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Moral hazard

Moral hazard occurs when imperfectly observed actions change after a contract alters incentives. Insurance may reduce precautions even without fraud or bad intent.

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Asymmetric information
Related
Adverse selection, Principal-agent problem, Incentives
Further reading
OpenStax: 16.2 Insurance and Imperfect Information
0 2 4 6 8 10 expected private cost / CU no insurance 8 10 full coverage 3 0 deductible 80 7 8 take care no care less costly choice
Hypothetical risk-neutral choice after contracting, with effort hidden and premiums fixed. Expected private cost includes precaution cost plus uninsured expected loss. Full coverage removes this example’s monetary precaution incentive; a large deductible restores it while providing less risk protection.

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